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Abstract
The MYSEA project has produced an innovative
architecture and corrresponding engineering prototype
consisting of trusted security services and integrated
operating system mechanisms for the protection of
distributed multi-domain computing environments from
malicious code and other attacks. These security services
and mechanisms extend and interoperate with existing
workstations, applications and open source operating
systems, providing new capabilities for composing secure
distributed systems using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
components. The MYSEA technical demonstration
illustrates the MYSEA architecture, as well as the
mechanisms for providing multi-domain information
protection, trusted path extension and quality of security
service.
1. Introduction
The purpose of the Monterey Security Enhanced
Architecture (MYSEA, pronounced, my-SEE-ah) project
is to provide a trusted distributed operating environment
for enforcing multi-domain security policies, which
supports unmodified COTS productivity applications.  The
architecture encompasses a combination of many low-
assurance commercial components and relatively few
specialized (e.g., high-assurance) multi-domain
components. This arrangement permits the ongoing DoD
and U.S. Government investment in commodity personal
computer (PC) operating systems and applications to be
integrated into an environment where enforcement of
critical security policies is assigned to more trusted
elements.  Assurance is derived from the application of
high assurance system design and development methods to
the trusted elements as well as to the overall architecture.
We feature two demos, which illustrate the following
MYSEA characteristics and capabilities:
ß A distributed architecture for isolating trusted
components in support of commercial and open
source applications.  The innovative use of add-
on components in commercial client-server
systems can potentially magnify the impact of
trusted open source systems.
ß Global and persistent protection of multiple
protection domains, such that malicious code may
neither exfiltrate confidentially sensitive data, nor
corrupt information of higher integrity.
ß An open source trusted path mechanism for
assured and unambiguous user communication
with the trusted computing base.
ß Techniques for vertical integration of dynamic
security policy control functions with underlying
security services in a Quality of Security Service
framework [2].
1. MYSEA Domain Separation and Trusted
Path Demo
MYSEA is a distributed client-server architecture, the
major physical components of which are illustrated in
Figure 1:
ß Security enhanced servers which provide the
locus for security policy enforcement and host
various open source or commercial application
protocol servers, and
ß Security enhanced workstations that consist of
commercial-class PCs executing popular
commercial software products, along with
Trusted Path Extensions that provide trustworthy
policy support mechanisms and thus permit
server-enforced security policy to be distributed
across the network.
The MYSEA Server enforces the security policy and
controls access to information. At its heart is a security-
enhanced version of the OpenBSD operating system
(MYSEOS). Application protocol servers run on the
trusted server and provide services and interfaces to shared
resources. When MYSEOS is combined with untrusted,
but policy constrained (and, in some instances, policy
aware) application protocol servers, the result is the
MYSEA Server.
Each MYSEA workstation is a PC equipped with a
Trusted Path Extension device that provides MYSEA
policy support at the workstation. The MYSEA Server(s)
and the Trusted Path Extension(s) are the only components
directly connected to the physical network. Multiple
MYSEA Servers provide scalability within the desired
security policy perimeter.
Figure 1. Monterey Security Enhanced
Architecture (MYSEA)
1.1 Demonstration of Concepts
Using the Trusted Path Extension at the PC, users log
on to the MYSEA system by way of a trusted path,
establishing an identity for audit and access control
purposes, and then establish session attributes such as
current sensitivity level.  Subsequently, the user can log on
to the native client OS at the PC and use standard
commercial client software (e.g., web browser or e-mail
program) to access applications supported by the MYSEA
Server, or use any applications supported by the local PC.
From the PC the user can access any domain of server data
allowed by the security policy (for example, reading
domains of data that are lower in sensitivity than the
negotiated level) as well as access local data. By again
invoking the trusted path, the user can request to modify
session attributes, such as sensitivity level.
1.2 Multi-Domain Policy Enforcement
MYSEOS (depicted in Figure 2) is built on OpenBSD
as a set of kernel enhancements to create labeled protection
domains and a set of additional security services. The
MYSEOS kernel associates security attributes with active
and passive entities exported at the operating system
interface. Enhancements include a protected security
manager configured to interpret these attributes and
enforce policy according to configuration-specific rules.
An important policy for the MYSEOS kernel to enforce is
that malicious code may neither exfiltrate confidentially-
sensitive data nor corrupt information of higher integrity;
to support this, the MYSEOS kernel provides multi-
domain file system support, which provides for the global
and persistent separation of data into its respective
domains.
Figure 2. MYSEA server
1.3 Trusted path extension
The Trusted Path Services component supports multiple
locally attached terminals, as well as multiple remote
MYSEA workstations. Trusted Path Services maintains the
state of the user-to-MYSEA interaction, for example, a
user may be logged in with default security attributes, but
may not have started a session executing untrusted
application code. Trusted Path Services provides an
interface to the Security Support Services component to
support identification and authentication, negotiation of
domain or domain range, password modification, account
creation and deletion, and user security attribute
maintenance. Once a session has been established, the
Trusted Path Services provides a distributed Session Status
Database to the Secure Session Services component.
The Trusted Path Extension, under direction from the
MYSEA server, supports the following services:
ß Secure Attention Key – this service permits users
to initiate unambiguous communication with
MYSEOS for unspoofable presentation and
capture of security critical data at the user
interface. The secure attention key must cause a
state change in the Trusted Path Extension such
that an unforgeable communications path (viz. a
trusted path) to MYSEOS is established.
ß Trusted Path Services – when the trusted path is
invoked, the user may elect to input security
critical information, such as a password. The
trusted path services ensure that prompts from the
server are displayed and that an input mechanism
for replies is available.
ß Controlled LAN Access – provide non-by
passable, controlled access to the LAN from the
PC. Malicious software on the PC cannot bypass
the Trusted Path.
ß Communications and cryptographic services –
provide protected communication channels
between the server and the Trusted Path
Extension. These protected communications are
based upon protocols that support both the
establishment and maintenance of a trusted path
and session-level communications, such as to
initiate communication with the server (via the
secure attention key), as well as to receive and to
respond to commands from the MYSEA Server.
ß Negotiated Session Services – these mechanisms
ensure trusted object reuse at the client PC for
both primary and secondary storage. When a user
chooses to change domains, certain policies
require that information associated with the
previous domain be purged from the untrusted
PC, e.g. previous session information cannot be
reused by subsequent sessions in conflict with the
distributed security policy.  The Trusted Path
Extension ensures that object reuse requirements
are met with each session change and as dictated
by policy for session level changes. The Trusted
Path Extension supports object reuse directives
issued by MYSEOS. These directives may
include both functional and procedural actions at
the workstation.
ß Control of Security Critical Activities –control
the client and its resources at the time of boot and
control security critical actions throughout the
client session.
2. Quality of Security Service Demo
MYSEA can be integrated with an external resource or
QoS manager to provide a means of dynamically
managing its security and performance characteristics. The
MYSEA QoSS Manager is the external QoSS interface to
MYSEA, and governs security and performance factors of
the various MYSEA components, for example, which
application protocol servers the client may interact with,
and the cryptographic protection characteristics of the
underlying communication channels. The QoSS security
and connectivity database is managed by the QoSS
manager on the MYSEA server, and is distributed to the
Trusted Path Extensions, as needed, to modify the
protection services afforded an ongoing session.
The Quality of Security Service demonstration shows
how decision makers can interact with a QoSS manager to
designate the overall security posture of the network. This
feature provides the decision maker with a simple set of
choices, hiding the underlying complexity of the quality of
security service mechanisms [3]. A version of IPsec
adapted to provide automated, dynamic Quality of Security
Service through the use of an enhanced version of a policy
server [1] permits selection of policy-consistent protection
mechanisms.
3. Conclusion
MYSEA is a trusted distributed operating environment
for enforcing multi-domain security policies that supports
unmodified COTS productivity applications.  The
architecture encompasses a combination of many
(untrusted) commercial components and relatively few
trusted multi-domain components. Our prototype
demonstration illustrates several innovations for protecting
multiple data domains and for managing security policies
and security services in support of critical applications,
including:
ß A distributed trusted architecture that utilizes
commercial and open source applications to
protect and provide access to multiple data
domains.
ß An open source trusted path mechanism.
ß Techniques for vertical integration of security
policy control functions with underlying security
services.
References
[1] Blaze, Matt, Feigenbaum, Joan, and Keromytis, Angelos D.,
KeyNote: Trust Management for Public-Key Infrastructures,
In Proceedings of the 1998 Security Protocols International
Workshop, Springer LNCS vol. 1550, pp. 59 - 63. April
1998, Cambridge, England. Also AT&T Technical Report
98.11.1.
[2] Irvine, C. E., and Levin, T., "Quality of Security Service,"
in the Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms
Workshop, September 2000.
[3] Mohan, Raj, Xml Based Adaptive Ipsec Policy Management
In A Trust Management Context, Masters Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2002
                                                           
